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INTRODUCTION
Michael B. Fortier was convicted for possession of cocaine after he
pled guilty to Count I of a three-count indictment. The remaining
counts were dismissed. In sentencing Fortier, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of North Dakota considered a second
quantity of cocaine, his alleged possession of which was the basis for
dismissed Count II, in addition to the cocaine identified in Count I
that Fortier had admitted possessing. Fortier's possession of the sec-
ond amount of cocaine was established at the sentencing hearing by
hearsay evidence that was deemed reliable by the trial court. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in United States
1
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v. Fortier,' reversed the district court,2 holding that Fortier's rights
under the confrontation clause had been violated when hearsay evi-
dence was admitted at the sentencing hearing.3
The Eighth Circuit reversed the conviction despite the fact that the
right of confrontation has consistently been held inapplicable at sen-
tencing hearings.4 In reversing the conviction, the court departed
from the conventional due process analysis for fact situations of this
type and recognized an independent and direct right under the con-
frontation clause.5 The Fortier court reached its conclusion with a
very brief discussion of the legal issue and without refuting the pres-
ent state of the law.
Regardless of the legal principles applied, the facts in Fortier illus-
trate the unfairness of sentencing an offender for conduct which did
not result in a conviction. The implementation of the sentencing
guidelines can make fact-finding an important part of a sentencing
hearing.6 As the facts of Fortier persuasively show, the principles un-
derlying the confrontation clause should apply to some degree at sen-
tencing. Recognizing this premise, however, does not require that
the confrontation clause itself be applied at sentencing. The Eighth
Circuit's previous analysis, and that which is currently used by other
1. 911 F.2d 100 (8th Cir. 1990).
2. Id. at 101-02.
3. Id. at 101. The confrontation clause states, "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him
.... U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
4. For example, in Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576 (1959), the petitioner
entered a guilty plea to murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Subse-
quently, in another court, he pled guilty to a kidnapping which occurred with the
murder. Prior to the imposition of the kidnapping sentence, the state's attorney read
a statement regarding the details of the crimes and the petitioner's criminal record.
Id. at 579-80. The Court held that admission into evidence of the statements of the
state's attorney did not deprive the petitioner of his right to due process. Id. at 584.
In Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), the petitioner was convicted of
first degree murder and the jury recommended life imprisonment. Id. at 241. The
trial court sentenced appellant to death after considering information regarding his
previous criminal record. Id. at 242. Appellant was not permitted to confront or
cross-examine the witness on that subject. Id. at 243. The Supreme Court, affirming
the lower court, provided that, in considering the sentence to be imposed, including
a death sentence, a sentencing judge is not restricted to information received in open
court and is granted wide discretion as to the sources and types of information used.
Id. at 252.
In Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977), however, the petitioner was con-
victed of first degree murder and the trial judge imposed the death penalty after
considering portions of a presentence investigation report which had not been dis-
closed to the parties' attorneys. Id. at 353. The Supreme Court concluded that such
a procedure does not satisfy the constitutional mandate that no person shall be de-
prived of life without due process of law. Id. at 362.
5. Fortier, 911 F.2d at 104.
6. See infra note 99.
[Vol. 17
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CONFRONTATION AT SENTENCING
circuits, applies the general principle of confrontation through the
due process clause. Greater clarity in the law can resolve the
problems which are evident in Fortier.
This Case Note argues, as has been argued by at least one other
circuit court,7 that the due process issue in Fortier should be given
attention by the Supreme Court. Part I surveys the interpretations of
the confrontation clause, the policy goals behind the Sentencing
Guidelines, and the case law concerning confrontation at sentencing.
Part II describes the facts and holding in Fortier and discusses the
issues the court did not address. The Case Note concludes by pro-
posing that, absent further guidance from the Supreme Court, where
a disputed fact at sentencing amounts to a new charge or otherwise
has an impact similar to that which it would have at trial, the offender
should be afforded the benefits of confrontation as an essential ele-
ment of due process.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Origin and Evolution of the Confrontation Clause
1. Early Recognition of the Right to Confront
The principle behind the confrontation clause-that a criminal
suspect must face his or her accusers to receive a fair trial-was rec-
ognized as early as the Roman era, as noted in the sedition trial of
the Apostle Paul.8 In sixteenth century England, the right to face
accusers was established by statute for those accused of treason. 9
Despite this codification, however, the right was not consistently ob-
7. In United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990), the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit expressed its desire for the Supreme
Court to address the issue: "The resolution of the question posed in this footnote is
vital to the administration of sentencing proceedings under the Sentencing Reform
Act regime. We hope therefore that the Supreme Court in the near future will decide whether
confrontation clause principles are applicable at sentencing hearings .... Id. at 1103 n.19
(emphasis added).
The Kikumura court did not adopt the Fortier approach. Instead, it strengthened
the offender's interest in cross-examination by raising the level of reliability neces-
sary for due process requirements to be met.
8. Acts 25:1-22. Porcius Festus, when presenting the facts of Paul's case to King
Agrippa of Judea, stated that "it is not the Roman custom to hand over any man
before he has faced his accusers, and has had an opportunity to defend himself
against their charges." Acts 25:16. As it turned out, the accusers "did not charge him
with any of the crimes I had expected. Instead, they had some points of dispute
about their own religion .... Acts 25:18-19. King Agrippa held that Paul had not
done "anything that deserves death or imprisonment." Acts 26:31.
9. 5 Edw. 6, ch. 11 (1552). The statute stated that a person could not be con-
victed of treason unless "accused by two lawful Accusers [who], if they be then living,
shall be brought in Person before the Party so accused." Id. See also Note, The Sixth
Amendment Right of Defendants to Confront Adverse Witnesses, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1547,
1547-55 (1989) (providing a historical overview of the right to confront adverse wit-
1991]
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served. 1o This inconsistency continued until, after declaring its inde-
pendence from England, the American colonies adopted the notion
of due process rights. 1
The best-known example of the denial of the confrontation right,
and probably one of the most egregious, is the 1603 trial of Sir Wal-
ter Raleigh.' 2 Raleigh was charged for conspiring with Lord Cob-
ham to prevent the coronation of James I. A false affidavit of
Cobham's, induced by torture, led to Raleigh's conviction and execu-
tion fifteen years later.13
The right to confront witnesses was increasingly seen as proper in
the aftermath of the 1637 trial of John Lilburne, who was charged
with importing books which criticized the bishops of the Church of
England.14 He was tried and convicted in the Star Chamber,15 hav-
ing not been allowed to face his accusers. He was freed three years
later by a resolution of Parliament which also condemned the Star
Chamber's methods as "illegal" and "tyrannical," thus giving the
right to confront accusers a strong endorsement.16
nesses, from Parliament's enactment of confrontation statutes in the sixteenth cen-
tury to the American colonial adoption of similar due process rights).
10. Note, supra note 9, at 1547 n.l. Apparently, the right to confront was ob-
served at ordinary trials in the azzises but was not observed by specially convened
tribunals. The testimony against treason defendants usually consisted of exparte affi-
davits and depositions coerced from witnesses by threat of torture or by actual tor-
ture. Id. (citing Pollit, The Right of Confrontation: Its History and Modern Dress, 9J. PuB.
L. 381, 388 (1959)).
11. See generally 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 214-16 (7th
ed. 1972) [hereinafter W. HotLDswoRTH].
12. See Raleigh's Trial, 2 How. ST. TR. 16 (1603).
13. See Note, supra note 9, at 1547-48. Raleigh learned in a letter from Cobham
that Cobham had been forced to "admit" Raleigh's guilt. Cobham recanted his ad-
mission in the letter. Id.
At trial, Raleigh said to the court,
It is strange to see how you press me still with Lord Cobham, and yet will
not produce him; ... he is in the house hard by, and may soon be brought
hither; let him be produced, and if he will yet accuse me or avow this confes-
sion of his, it shall convict me and ease you of further proof.
Id. at 1548 n.7.
14. See The Trial ofJohn Lilburne and John Wharton for Printing and Publishing
Seditious Books, 3 How. ST. TR. 1315, 1321-22 (1627).
15. The Star Chamber became the primary criminal court in England during the
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries because the Court of Chancery was limited to civil
cases. The Star Chamber had great power over both nobility and commoners. See
Note, supra note 9, at 1550 (citing 2 L.B. SMITH, THIS REALM OF ENGLAND 85 (2d ed.
1971)). Lilburne was sentenced to stand in the pillory and to be whipped, fined, and
imprisoned. Id.
16. See Note, supra note 9, at 1550-51. The right to confront was confirmed with
finality in the 1696 trial of Sir John Fenwick. There, the court stated, "Our law re-
quires persons to appear and give their testimony 'viva voce'; and we see that their
testimony appears credible or not by their very countenances and the manner of their
delivery; and their falsity may sometimes be discovered by questions that the party
[Vol. 17
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2. American Codification and Interpretation
a. First Recognition
The American colonies inherited the English principle that an ac-
cused should have the right to confront accusers.t 7 Because cross-
examination assists a jury in determining truth, 18 the ability to con-
front accusers was considered an essential part of the right to a trial
by jury. '9
Because the colonists were denied the right to confront accusers
by the British monarchy and by the British governors in America,20
they doggedly sought to secure the right in their new governments.
The Virginia Declaration of Rights, which was a forerunner of the
Bill of Rights, explicitly provided for the right.21 A decade later, citi-
zens insisted upon inclusion of the right to confront accusers in the
Constitution.22 Eventually, the right was adopted in the sixth
may ask them ...." Proceedings Against Sir John Fenwick, 13 How. ST. TR. 537,
591-92, 638 (1696) in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 247 (P. Kurland & R. Lerner
1987).
17. See generally 9 W. HouLSwORTH, supra note 11, at 214-16.
18. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1365, at 28 (Chadbourne rev. 1974). Wigmore
states that the essential element of a fair jury trial is the cross-examination of wit-
nesses. Confrontation is essential only because it ensures that cross-examination can
be achieved. Id Cross-examination is important for two reasons. First, it validates
the testimony by establishing the identity of the witness. Second, a jury may observe
and judge both the advantages and disadvantages of the witness' testimony in a way
that is impossible if one party merely reads selected portions of an affidavit. Id. at
151-53; see also Note, supra note 9, at 1547-55 (describing the historical context of
how the confrontation clause sought to preserve the essential element of cross-exam-
ination in the truth-seeking process).
19. See Note, supra note 9, at 1549 (The right to confrontation was parallel to
guaranteeing individual liberties.).
20. Colonists who were tried in courts loyal to the Crown were sometimes denied
the right to confront accusers. Colonial jurors, in turn, responded by dismissing
cases supported only by testimony of anonymous informants. Id. at 1552. The gov-
ernor of one colonial state was removed from office, in part because he "forced men
upon oath to turn informers, and ... the person accused is not admitted to be con-
fronted with, or defend himself against his defamers." Id. (quoting Pollit, supra note
10, at 391).
21. That document stated that "in all capital or criminal prosecutions a man hath
a right ... to be confronted with the accusers and witnesses ...." VIRGINIA DECLA-
RATION OF RIGHTS § 8 (June 12, 1776) in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note
16, at 259. Confrontation was included in corresponding documents of several other
states, including Delaware, Vermont, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Maryland, North
Carolina, and New Hampshire. See B. SCHWARTZ, GREAT RIGHTS OF MANKIND: A His-
TORY OF THE AMERICAN BILL OF RIGHTS 89 (1977).
22. Abraham Holmes of Plymouth, Massachusetts, argued at that state's ratifying
convention that the right to confront was essential. He said:
The mode of trial [specified in the draft constitution] is altogether in-
determined; whether the criminal is to be allowed the benefit of counsel;
whether he is to be allowed to meet his accuser face to face; whether he is to
be allowed to confront the witnesses, and have the advantages of cross-ex-
1991]
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amendment of the Bill of Rights.23
b. Early Interpretations
The United States Supreme Court first interpreted the confronta-
tion clause in an 1895 decision, Mattox v. United States.24 In Mattox,
the Court held that testimony given by a witness in a trial could be
introduced in a retrial if the witness had since died.25 The Court
rejected a literal approach and recognized the common law excep-
tions to the hearsay rule that existed in England before the Constitu-
tion was adopted.26 Though the defendant had not faced his accuser
in the retrial, the Court reasoned that the confrontation clause "must
occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the ne-
cessities of the case." 27 The result here satisfied the goal of the con-
amination, we are not yet told. ... On the whole.... we shall find Congress
possessed of powers enabling them to institute judicatories little less inaus-
picious than ... the Inquisition.
DEBATE IN MASSACHUSETrs RATIFYING CONVENTION (Jan. 30, 1788) in THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTrruTION, supra note 16, at 260 (emphasis in original).
23. The sixth amendment states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accu-
sation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added). For more on the history of the confronta-
tion clause, see Baker, The Right to Confrontation, the Hearsay. Rules, and Due Process: A
Proposal for Determining When Hearsay May Be Used in Criminal Triats, 6 CONN. L. REV.
529, 532-34 (1974).
Although the language of the confrontation clause is absolute and appears to
admit no exceptions, it is interpreted otherwise. These interpretations follow the
common law hearsay rule, to which there were also exceptions. Professor Wigmore
explains that the clause, as interpreted, actually would have a qualifier saying, "except
when the witness is deceased, ill, out of the jurisdiction, or otherwise unavailable."
WIGMORE, supra note 19, at 158. Thus, Professor Wigmore states that the constitu-
tional right to confront is the right to have the hearsay rule enforced: "The rule
sanctioned by the Constitution is the hearsay rule as to cross-examination, with all
the exceptions that may legitimately be found, developed, or created therein." Id.
24. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
25. Id. at 240, 250. The Court noted that the witnesses were cross-examined in
the first trial. Id. at 240.
26. Id. See 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 219. The Court, lacking any
prior interpretations of the confrontation clause, drew upon both English precedent
and cases from the several states. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 240-42.
27. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243. The Court explained the flexibility of the clause by
noting:
To say that a criminal, after having once been convicted by the testimony of
a certain witness, should go scot free simply because death has closed the
mouth of that witness, would be carrying his constitutional protection to an
unwarrantable extent. The law in its wisdom declares that the rights of the
[Vol. 17
6
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 6
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol17/iss3/6
CONFRONTATION AT SENTENCING
frontation clause, which was stated by the Court as follows:
The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was
to prevent deposition or ex parte affidavits, such as were sometimes
admitted in civil cases, being used against the prisoner in lieu of a
personal examination and cross-examination of the witness in
which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recol-
lection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling
him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at
him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in
which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.
2 8
The Supreme Court interpreted the confrontation clause again
four years later in Kirby v. United States.2 9 In Kirby, the Court held
that the clause had been violated when prosecutors introduced the
written record from the trials of the defendant's co-conspirators.
0
This practice, authorized by statute, was found unconstitutional be-
cause the defendant had no opportunity to cross-examine witnesses
at the trials of the other men. Instead, he was confronted "only with
the record of another criminal prosecution, with which he had no
connection and the evidence in which was not given in his
presence."Si
The principles behind the confrontation clause were delineated
further in 1934 by the Court's decision in Snyder v. Massachusetts.
3 2
The Snyder Court held that the defendant's constitutional rights were
not violated when he was absent from the jury's view of a murder
scene.3 3 Justice Cardozo, writing for the Court, stated that the right
to confront "is limited to the stages of the trial when there are wit-
nesses to be questioned."3 4 The jurors' viewing of the murder scene
public shall not be wholly sacrificed in order that an incidental benefit may
be preserved to the accused.
Id.
28. Id. at 242-43.
29. 174 U.S. 47 (1899).
30. Id. at 55, 61. Two co-conspirators pled guilty and an additional one was
found guilty at trial. Id. at 49.
31. Id. at 55. The Court stated that the defendant can be convicted only "by
witnesses who confront him at the trial, upon whom he can look while being tried,
whom he is entitled to cross-examine, and whose testimony he may impeach in every
mode authorized by the established rules governing the trial or conduct of criminal
cases." Id.
32. 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
33. Id. at 110, 122. Justice Cardozo reasoned that though a defendant's pres-
ence will always satisfy the constitutional right, his absence from a particular stage of
a proceeding is not necessarily a denial of the right to confront accusers. Id. at 117.
34. Id. at 107. The Court restated the purpose of the confrontation clause: "It
was intended to prevent the conviction of the accused upon depositions or ex parte
affidavits, and particularly to preserve the right of the accused to test the recollection
of the witness in the exercise of the right of cross-examination." Id. (quoting Dow-
dell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 330 (191 )).
1991]
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was regarded as a mechanical and formal stage of the trial, not as a
stage where evidence was collected and cross-examination was
possible.3 5
Justice Cardozo assumed, for the sake of argument, that the right
to confront one's accusers was a condition of due process, as guaran-
teed by the fourteenth amendment. 36 Taking the record as a whole,
the practice in Snyder was not "so flagrantly unjust that the Constitu-
tion of the United States steps in to forbid it."
' s
c. Modern Interpretations
Invocation of the right of confrontation has become more com-
mon since the 1965 decision in Pointer v. Texas.38 This decision ap-
plied the confrontation clause to the states as a fundamental right
encompassed by the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of due pro-
cess. 39 In the years since Pointer, many important appeals have come
to the United States Supreme Court from the state supreme courts.
40
Pointer also represents the first case of a second category of con-
frontation cases. Up to this point, the appellate courts were primar-
ily concerned with defining the constitutional exceptions to the
confrontation clause. But Pointer and its companion case, Douglas v.
Alabama,4' addressed the scope of the right to confront where some
confrontation had actually taken place.42
35. Id. at 114-15. The dissent took issue with this conclusion, stating that the
nature of the view, and the presence of all other parties (judge, stenographer, jury,
prosecutor, defense counsel) makes the view evidentiary in character. Id. at 123-26
(Roberts, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 106. The fourteenth amendment states, in relevant part: "[N]or shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
37. Snyder, 291 U.S. at 115.
38. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
39. Id. at 403.
40. E.g., Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3170-71 (1990) (Defendant unsuc-
cessfully challenged a state statute permitting a young victim of sexual abuse to tes-
tify via closed-circuit television.); Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1021-22 (1988)
(Defendant successfully challenged state statute requiring young victims of sexual
abuse to testify from behind one-way screens.); Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730,
747-48 (1987) (Defendant unsuccessfully challenged conviction after being excluded
from hearing to determine competency of child witnesses; confrontation clause not
implicated where no evidence is taken.); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) (De-
fendant unsuccessfully challenged use of testimony given during a preliminary hear-
ing.); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (Defendant successfully
challenged the common-law rule preventing him from questioning his own witness,
who testified against him.); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970) (Defendant un-
successfully challenged admissibility of out-of-court statement of witness, who testi-
fied at trial and was subject to cross-examination.).
41. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
42. In Pointer, the Court found that the defendant's right of confrontation had
[Vol. 17
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This second category of cases, those where confrontation is per-
mitted but the effectiveness of cross-examination is questioned, has
yielded results based on rather literal interpretations of the confron-
tation clause.43 The Court, however, has continued to observe the
been denied where he came face-to-face with his accuser only at a preliminary hear-
ing where he was not represented by counsel. Pointer, 380 U.S. at 406-07. Likewise,
in Douglas, the Court found that the defendant's right of confrontation was denied
where an accomplice's statement was read into the record. The accomplice could not
be cross-examined because he claimed his fifth amendment right not to be compelled
to be a witness against himself. Douglas, 380 U.S. at 418-19. In both of these cases,
the Court was not merely concerned that a confrontation literally occurred. Instead,
the Court inquired further into the quality of the confrontation to determine whether
the defendant had a full opportunity to cross-examine his accuser. See also 5 WIG-
MORE, supra note 19, § 1365, at 28 (Confrontation clause exists to ensure cross-exam-
ination, the essential element of a fair jury trial.).
The United States Supreme Court found a constitutional violation where the
defendant was not allowed to cross-examine his own witness. Chambers v. Missis-
sippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973). The common law had allowed cross-examination only for
"adverse" witnesses. In Chambers, although the witness implicated the defendant by
giving a different version of the facts than he did in a pretrial statement, the trial
court did not consider him to be an "adverse" witness. Id. at 297. The Supreme
Court rejected this formal distinction and found that the witness' interests were, in
reality, hostile to those of the defendant: "We reject the notion that a right of such
substance in the criminal process may be governed by that technicality or by any
narrow and unrealistic definition of the word 'against.' " Id. at 298. Thus, stated the
Court, the defendant is not afforded due process of law without confronting this wit-
ness. Id.
The Court explored the scope of the right of confrontation in California v.
Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970). In Green, the Court held that the defendant's right was
not violated even though the witness had a loss of memory. Thus, the witness' testi-
mony given at a pretrial hearing was admissible. Id. at 158-61.
The Court considered similar facts 10 years later in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56
(1980). Though the witness in Roberts did not appear at trial, the witness' pretrial
testimony was admitted because the defendant's counsel engaged in meaningful
cross-examination at the pretrial hearing. Id. at 70-71. The Court also repeated the
suggestion of Green that the mere opportunity to cross-examine at a pretrial hearing,
without actual cross-examination, might be sufficient to satisfy the constitutional
right of confrontation. Id. at 70 (citing Green, 399 U.S. at 200 n.8 (Brennan, J., dis-
senting)).
Most recently, the Court has considered the quality of confrontation in the spe-
cial case where young victims of alleged sexual abuse testify against the alleged
abuser. In Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988), the Court held that a state statute
allowing any young victim of abuse, as a matter of right, to testify from behind a one-
way screen was unconstitutional. But, in Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990),
the Court held that the confrontation clause does not prohibit a victim from testify-
ing by closed-circuit television if a finding of necessity is made. Id. at 3171. Thus,
the right to confront includes only the right of the accused to face the accuser and
not the right of the accused to have the accuser face the accused, as a dissent argued
it should. Id. at 3171-76 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Text of sixth amendment was in-
tended to ensure a procedure where the witness would endure face-to-face confron-
tation while testifying, thus assuring reliable evidence.).
43. For a thorough discussion of the two categories of confrontation clause juris-
1991]
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hearsay exceptions when considering the first category of confronta-
tion cases, those concerning the admissibility of out-of-court state-
ments where no confrontation takes place.44 In two recent cases,
United States v. Inadi,45 and Bourjaily v. United States,46 the Court ad-
mitted out-of-court statements by co-conspirators.47 Furthermore,
the Court stated that "firmly-rooted exceptions" to the hearsay rule
may be presumed constitutionally sound without separate analysis.48
B. Right of Confrontation and Discretionary Sentencing
1. Decisions of the United States Supreme Court
As discussed above, the confrontation clause has been invoked at
trials and at pre-trial hearings to ensure that no defendant's guilt is
based upon unreliable information. To achieve this purpose, the
right of confrontation has been applied at all stages that have a bear-
ing on a defendant's guilt.49 However, the United States Supreme
Court has never held that the right of confrontation applies equally
to the penalty phase of trial.50
Williams v. New York 5' is the only Supreme Court case which deals
squarely with this question. In Williams, the defendant was convicted
of murder and sentenced to death.52 At sentencing, the judge con-
sidered information53 contained in a mandatory presentence report
that was prepared by a probation officer. The defendant argued on
prudence and the different analysis involved with each, see Shaviro, The Supreme
Court's Bifurcated Interpretation of the Confrontation Clause, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 383,
386-97 (1990).
44. See id. at 392-97.
45. 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
46. 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
47. In Inadi, the Court considered statements made during the course of conspir-
acy, obtained by an authorized wiretap, to be more reliable than in-court statements.
Inadi, 475 U.S. at 395. And in Boujaily, the Court held that the hearsay exception for
co-conspirator statements contained in the Federal Rules of Evidence is also an ex-
ception to the confrontation clause. Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 183-84 (citing FED. R. EVID.
801(d)(2)(E)).
48. Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 183-84.
49. See, e.g., Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934) (Defendant has a right
of confrontation when that right has a substantial relation to his opportunity to de-
fend himself.).
50. The penalty phase is the portion of a criminal proceeding where an offender
(a defendant who has been found guilty or who has pled guilty) is sentenced. In
contrast, the guilt phase is that portion of a criminal proceeding where a jury hears
evidence and determines guilt or innocence. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241,
246-47 (1949).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 242.
53. Thejudge learned that the defendant had confessed to or had been a partici-
pant in 30 prior burglaries, although he had not been convicted of any of the burgla-
ries. Id. at 244.
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appeal that he was denied due process because the sentence was
"based upon information supplied by witnesses with whom [he] had
not been confronted and as to whom he had no opportunity for
cross-examination or rebuttal."54 The Court affirmed the conviction
and held that due process does not include a right to face accusers at
the penalty phase of a trial.55
The Court centered its discussion around the history of eviden-
tiary limitations at sentencing.56 The Court noted that, in both Eng-
land and America, courts have always exercised "wide discretion in
the sources and types of evidence used to assist [them] in determin-
ing the kind and extent of punishment to be imposed."5 7 Wide dis-
cretion promotes the objective that "the punishment should fit the
offender and not merely the crime."58
Williams rests on a crucial distinction between the guilt phase of a
criminal proceeding and the penalty phase. The strict evidentiary
rules of a trial protect a defendant by ensuring that only reliable evi-
dence is used to determine guilt or innocence. Also, the defendant is
protected by rules which prohibit irrelevant evidence.59 But, under
the sentencing policies in use at the time of the Williams decision, the
narrow rules which confined a trial court as to the question of a de-
fendant's guilt or innocence, 60 did not so confine the court in im-
posing the sentence. 6t The policy basis for this varying treatment of
evidence is that a court trying to fit a punishment to the particular
54. Id. at 243 (quoting People v. Williams, 298 N.Y. 803, 804, 83 N.E.2d 698,
699 (1949)).
55. Id. at 251.
56. Id. at 246-47.
57. Id. at 246. The Court noted that such discretion is manifested in the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id. (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 32).
58. Id. at 247. The Court added, "The belief no longer prevails that every of-
fense in a like legal category calls for an identical punishment without regard to the
past life and habits of a particular offender." Id. In New York, it was the policy for a
sentencing judge to consider an offender's "past life, health, habits, conduct, and
mental and moral propensities." Id. at 245.
59. If a tribunal is "concerned solely with the issue of guilt of a particular of-
fense[,] [the tribunal should not be] influenced to convict for that offense by evidence
that the defendant had habitually engaged in other misconduct." Id. at 247.
The Court asserted that "[m]odern changes in the treatment of offenders [made]
it more necessary . . . than a century ago for observance of the distinctions in the
evidential procedure in the trial and sentencing processes." Id. at 248-49. In other
words, where there is more discretion in sentencing, there is a greater justification
for the distinction between the two phases. This implies that, where there is less
discretion in sentencing, as there is today, there is less justification for the distinction.
60. Id. at 246-47.
61. Even where a judge has wide discretion in issuing a sentence, however, that
sentence cannot be based on misinformation. See, e.g., United States v. Tucker, 404
U.S. 443, 447 (1972) (Court reversed sentence that was based on judge's considera-
tion of two prior convictions which were later found unconstitutional.).
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needs of the offender and the situation requires information that is
not directly relevant to proof of the commission of the crime.62
The Court further justified its decision by noting that extending
the procedural rules of the guilt phase to the penalty phase would be
impractical.63 Requiring in-court presentation of all evidence used
at sentencing, the Court stated, would impede "efforts to improve
the administration of criminal justice." 64 Assuming that efficiency
and accuracy in fact-finding are sometimes in conflict, it is clear that
practicality is a feature the Court values highly.
Williams v. New York was reaffirmed a decade later in Williams v.
Oklahoma.65 In this case, a defendant was sentenced to death after
the state's attorney gave an unsworn statement at the sentencing
hearing. The statement recounted the details of the defendant's
crime and his criminal record.66 The Court, citing Williams v. New
York, held that the defendant was not denied due process by the
judge's consideration of the undisputed facts when giving the
sentence. 67
Although Williams v. New York has not been overruled, the
Supreme Court has noted that there are exceptional situations where
that holding must yield. In Specht v. Patterson,68 the Supreme Court
held that a defendant has the right to confront his accusers if new
fact-finding at a sentencing hearing is the equivalent of a separate
62. "Highly relevant-if not essential-to [the judge's] selection of an appropri-
ate sentence is the possession of the fullest information possible concerning the de-
fendant's life and characteristics." Williams, 337 U.S. at 247.
63. "The type and extent of this information make totally impractical if not im-
possible open court testimony with cross-examination. Such a procedure could end-
lessly delay criminal administration in a retrial of collateral issues." Id. at 250.
64. Id. at 251.
65. 358 U.S. 576 (1959).
66. Id. at 579-80.
67. The Court stated:
[O]nce the guilt of the accused has been properly established, the sentenc-
ing judge.., is not restricted to evidence derived from the examination and
cross-examination of witnesses in open court but may, consistently with the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, consider responsible
unsworn or 'out-of-court' information relative to the circumstances of the
crime and to the convicted person's life and characteristics.
... [T]he State's Attorney's statement of the details of the crime and of
petitioner's criminal record-all admitted by petitioner to be true-did not
deprive petitioner of fundamental fairness or of any right of confrontation
or cross-examination.
. ..Upon [the guilty] plea it became the duty of the trial judge to im-
pose an appropriate sentence .... Necessarily, the exercise of a sound dis-
cretion in such a case required consideration of all the circumstances of the
crime .... In discharging his duty of imposing a proper sentence, the sen-
tencingjudge is authorized, if not required, to consider all of the mitigating
and aggravating circumstances involved in the crime.
Id. at 584-85 (footnotes omitted).
68. 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
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criminal proceeding.69 In Specht, the defendant was convicted of a
criminal sexual offense with a juvenile. After a jury entered a guilty
verdict, he was sentenced under a separate statute, the Sex Offend-
ers Act, which may be applied at sentencing if the trial court believes
that the offender is a continuing threat to public safety.70 The de-
fendant was given an indeterminate sentence of up to life in prison.7 1
Pointing out that the second statute requires findings of fact that
were not included in the first statute,72 the Court held that the appli-
cation of a new statute was actually a "new charge."73 Thus, the de-
fendant was entitled to due process, which included the right to "be
confronted with witnesses against him [and to] have the right to
cross-examine [them]."74
The Supreme Court has shown that Williams v. New York has other
limitations as well. In Gardner v. Florida,75 the Court held that a de-
fendant sentenced to death was denied due process by the judge's
use of information in a presentence report that was not revealed to
the parties. Though the facts of Gardner were similar to Williams, the
Court stated that Williams did not apply directly because the defend-
ant in Gardner did not have an opportunity to challenge the informa-
tion.76 Also, the defendant in Gardner was given the penalty of death,
a penalty whose procedures require closer examination.77
The Gardner decision linked the application of the due process
clause to the critical stage theory.78 The Gardner Court stated that
69. Id. at 610.
70. The defendant was originally charged with only the first statute. The second
statute was applied at sentencing by the trial judge, who considered the underlying
conviction and the additional factors of "whether a person constitutes a threat of
bodily harm to the public, or is an habitual offender and mentally ill." Id. at 608.
Thus, the defendant was subjected to an additional charge at sentencing which car-
ried an additional sentence.
71. Id. at 607.
72. In Specht, the additional finding of fact was the defendant's danger to society.
This factor was not an element of the underlying crime, which considered only the
defendant's conduct. Id. at 608.
73. Id. at 610.
74. Id.
75. 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
76. Id. at 356.
77. Id. at 357-58. The Court stated:
[D]eath is a different kind of punishment from any other which may be im-
posed in this country. From the point of view of the defendant, it is different
in both its severity and its finality. From the point of view of society, the
action of the sovereign in taking the life of one of its citizens also differs
dramatically from any other legitimate state action. It is of vital importance
to the defendant and to the community that any decision to impose the
death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or
emotion.
Id. (citations omitted).
78. The critical stage theory serves the function of determining when the right to
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sentencing is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding, a proposition
supported by Mempa v. Rhay 79 and Specht v. Patterson.8 0 The defend-
ant in Gardner was denied due process because his attorney could not
attack the information contained in the presentence report. Thus,
the sentencing phase is recognized as an important stage where an
offender's rights must be protected. Part of the protection required
by Gardner is a limit on the judicial discretion that existed at the time
of Williams.
2. Decisions of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
In the Eighth Circuit, Williams has been interpreted in various
ways. In an early case, the Eighth Circuit held that the trial court's
use of information from the probation officer's report was consistent
with due process. 8 ' Most Eighth Circuit cases applying Williams have
allowed wide latitude to courts in their sentencing procedures.
8 2
Williams was applied differently in 1973, however, when an Eighth
Circuit panel interpreted it to require a unique and individualized sen-
tence.8 3 But the most recent case applying Williams properly con-
strued it to give ajudge flexibility to issue any reasonable sentence.
8 4
By contrast, the Eighth Circuit has largely forgotten Specht v. Patter-
son.8 5 A dissenting opinion in United States v. Dace8 6 utilized Specht to
counsel, as guaranteed by the sixth amendment, applies. See United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967).
79. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
80. 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
81. Friedman v. United States, 200 F.2d 690, 697 (8th Cir. 1952). The court
stated, "The contention of the appellants that they were denied due process... is,
we think, sufficiently answered by the opinion of the Supreme Court in Williams v.
New York." Id. (citation omitted).
82. See, e.g., Britton v. Rogers, 631 F.2d 572 (8th Cir. 1980) (Lack of standards
for jury in determining length of sentence is constitutionally sound.); United States v.
Short, 597 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1979) (Trial court was within its discretion to consider
fact that defendant gave a forged copy of her college transcript to probation officer.).
83. Woosley v. United States, 478 F.2d 139, 143-44 (8th Cir. 1973) (Judge may
not apply a mechanical sentence but must follow Williams' individualized sentencing
guidelines; judge must determine type and extent of punishment to fit the offender.).
The court's objection was stated as follows: "We do not deal here with a sentence
imposed in the informed or sound discretion of a trial judge after consideration of all
the circumstances surrounding the crime .... A mechanical approach to sentencing
plainly conflicts with the sentencing guidelines announced by the Supreme Court in
Williams v. New York." Id. at 143 (citations omitted).
84. United States v. Blade, 811 F.2d 461 (8th Cir. 1987). The Blade court held
that the trial court properly considered hearsay implicating defendant in a shooting
because the defendant did not show that the challenged evidence was materially false
or unreliable and was the basis of his sentence. Id. at 469. The Blade decision quoted
from Williams extensively and asserted that "the rationale of Williams v. New York.
still applies." Id. at 468.
85. 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
86. 502 F.2d 897 (8th Cir. 1974).
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support the proposition that additional allegations should be proved
at trial, rather than argued at sentencing to increase the sentence.8 7
But in many intervening cases, Specht has been used for the more
general proposition that due process at sentencing requires a hear-
ing.88 Some cases have applied Specht in the context of a civil com-
mitment hearing.8 9 Only recently has Specht been applied as
intended to ensure that defendants receive the benefits of confronta-
tion at sentencing where additional fact-finding was necessary. 9o
These decisions indicate that the central proposition in Specht may
not be fully understood. Not surprising then, without such an un-
derstanding, courts have not used Specht to invoke more constitu-
tional protections for offenders at sentencing.
C. The Sentencing Guidelines
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (the Act) enacted fundamen-
tal sentencing reforms.91 The Act's chief purpose was to create
sentences which are more uniform and consistent.92 To accomplish
87. Id. at 901 (Lay, J., dissenting).
88. See United States v. Luster, 896 F.2d 1122, 1129 (8th Cir. 1990) (Due process
requires a hearing but does not require a jury trial on each fact that results in an
increase in a sentence.); United States v. Gooden, 892 F.2d 725, 728 (8th Cir. 1989)
(Constitution does not demand a standard of proof for factual issues at a sentencing
hearing.); Irwin v. Wolff, 529 F.2d 1119, 1122 (8th Cir. 1976) (In a habeas corpus
proceeding, a federal court may use a state court's finding of facts if the federal court
has examined the proceeding transcripts and is convinced the proceedings are fair.).
89. See Sebastian v. United States, 531 F.2d 900, 903 (8th Cir. 1976) (Hearing
required for person committed for insanity.); Allen v. Radack, 426 F. Supp. 1052,
1057 (D.S.D. 1977) (Confinement of one acquitted by reason of mental illness, based
solely on presumption of continuing insanity, violates due process.); Stamus v. Leon-
hardt, 414 F. Supp. 439, 445 (S.D. Iowa 1976) (Involuntary hospitalization for a men-
tally ill person requires some type of hearing and adequate notice but the hearing
need not be as extensive as a full hearing.); Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F. Supp. 509,
513-14 (D. Neb. 1975) (Persons alleged to be proper subjects for emergency involun-
tary commitment are entitled to effective and timely notice of hearing and informed
of right to counsel.).
90. United States v. Blade, 811 F.2d 461, 468-69 (8th Cir. 1987) (applying Specht
to sentencing under the Special Dangerous Offenders Act but finding that the sen-
tence did not rely on unreliable hearsay testimony). See also United States v. Duardi,
384 F. Supp. 861, 867 (W.D. Mo. 1973) (requiring, for increase in sentence, that
defendant be both a "special offender" and dangerous).
91. Sentencing Reform Act, ch. 227, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3551-3559 (1988)). The Act addressed probation, fines, and imprisonment.
92. The Act promoted goals which were first expressed more than a decade ear-
lier. Judge Marvin Frankel, United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York, was the most visible proponent of the reforms furthered by the Act. U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL SENTENCING GUIDE-
LINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS 2-3 (June 18, 1987). Judge Frankel suggested more
uniform sentences in a series of lectures at the University of Cincinnati Law School,
which were published at Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1972).
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this, it circumscribed the discretion of a sentencing judge by pre-
scribing a narrow range of possible sentences.95
The new approach embodied in the Act represented a distinct
break from the "outmoded rehabilitation model"94 used in the past.
The rehabilitation model was considered ineffective because then-
current prison conditions were not conducive to rehabilitation and,
even if they were, the parole commission was unable to detect when
a prisoner was finally rehabilitated.95 Thus, the 1984 reform con-
sisted of "a totally new and comprehensive sentencing system ...
based on a coherent philosophy." 96
Though the sentencing reform legislation sought to ensure the
fairness and certainty of sentences and sentencing practices, the leg-
islation also retained some flexibility within a prescribed range. Spe-
cifically, the Act provided that "[n]o limitation shall be placed on the
information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a
person convicted of an offense .. .for the purpose of imposing an
appropriate sentence." 97 The Sentencing Commission gave this sec-
tion effect by requiring a probation officer to prepare a presentence
report, commenting on the offender's personal characteristics. This
report is then used by the sentencing judge to determine an appro-
priate sentence.9 8 If there is a dispute between the parties as to any
factor in the presentence report, "the court may consider relevant
93. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 37, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3220.
94. Id. at 38, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &ADMIN. NEWS at 3221. The new approach
has not been received with unanimous approval. One member of the Fortier panel,
Chief Judge Donald P. Lay, has expressed displeasure with the policy embodied in
the 1984 reforms:
[The present criminal justice system] is accomplishing nothing more
than exorbitantly wasting tax dollars, creating a warehouse of human degra-
dation and, in the long run, breeding societal resentment that causes more
crime.
In the federal system the commitment to... sentence by the crime and not
by the individual is simply a corollary to this societal attitude.
With our nation facing both societal and fiscal crises of unrivaled pro-
portions, we must move quickly and forcefully to overhaul the current
system.
Lay, Criminal Justice System Has Failed, Must Change, Minneapolis Star Tribune, Oct. 28,
1990, at 23A, col. 1 (emphasis added).
95. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 93, at 38, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 3221.
96. Id. The Fifth Circuit has noted that "Congress abandoned the maxim that
'the punishment should fit the offender and not merely the crime.' " United States v.
Burch, 873 F.2d 765, 768 (5th Cir. 1989) (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S.
241, 247 (1949)).
97. 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (1988).
98. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS
§ 6AI.l (April 13, 1987) [hereinafter SENTENCING GUIDELINES].
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information without regard to its admissibility under the rules of evi-
dence applicable at trial, provided that the information has sufficient
indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy."
99
D. Confrontation at Sentencing Under the Guidelines
Since the sentencing guidelines were enacted, federal courts have
routinely followed the procedures stated by the new policy. 00 But
the change in sentencing philosophy has not been accompanied by a
change in the method of analysis of defendants' constitutional chal-
lenges. Despite the fact that the new sentencing policy gives greater
99. Id. at § 6AI.3(a). The Commission explained:
In current practice, factors relevant to sentencing are often determined
in an informal fashion. The informality is to some extent explained by the
fact that particular offense and offender characteristics rarely have a highly
specific or required sentencing consequence. This situation will no longer
exist under the sentencing guidelines. The court's resolution of disputed
sentencing factors will usually have a measurable effect on the applicable
punishment. More formality is therefore unavoidable if the sentencing pro-
cess is to be accurate and fair.
Id. at § 6AI.3, comment.
For a description of the hazards of a system where casual factfinding attains great
importance, see Note, How Unreliable Factfinding Can Undermine Sentencing Guidelines, 95
YALE L.J. 1258 (1986). The Note points out that factfinding at sentencing hearings
has an unwarranted degree of error. The Note likens this to putting a fresh coat of
paint on an old car-it looks better but actually works no better than before. Id. at
1260.
100. The sentencing guidelines themselves were upheld as constitutional in Mis-
tretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989), against a claim that the Sentencing
Commission's status as an article III body violates the case and controversy clause
and that the Commission's existence violated the separation of powers. The Court
noted that the Commission was constitutionally sound, considering the "flexible un-
derstanding of separation of powers .... Id. at 659. Also, the Court said Congress
could assign to the courts duties that are " 'necessary and proper... for carrying into
execution all the judgments which the judicial department has power to pro-
nounce.' " Id. at 663 (quoting Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 22
(1825).
Justice Scalia disagreed in a strident dissent:
Today's decision follows the regrettable tendency of our recent separa-
tion-of-powers jurisprudence, to treat the Constitution as though it were no
more than a generalized prescription that the functions of the Branches
should not be commingled too much-how much is too much to be deter-
mined, case-by-case, by this Court. The Constitution is not that. Rather, as
its name suggests, it is a prescribed structure, a framework, for the conduct
of Government. In designing that structure, the Framers themselves consid-
ered how much commingling was, in the generality of things, acceptable,
and set forth their conclusions in the document. That is the meaning of the
statements concerning acceptable commingling made by Madison in de-
fense of the proposed Constitution, and now routinely used as an excuse for
disregarding it.... He would be aghast, I think, to hear those words used as
justification for ignoring that carefully designed structure so long as, in the
changing view of the Supreme Court from time to time, 'too much commin-
gling' does not occur.
Id. at 682-83 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted; emphasis in original).
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emphasis to fact-finding at sentencing, courts have not made adjust-
ments in the legal standards which are applied.
Many courts cite two cases, both decided before the sentencing
guidelines were enacted, which have shaped the law in this area.
United States v. Marshall 101 stated that any information may be consid-
ered so long as it has "sufficient indicia of reliability to support its
probable accuracy . *..."102 Marshall followed United States v. Fat-
Ico,' 0 the case which gave its name to the "Fatico hearing." The
Court in Fatico held that hearsay may be considered "where there is
good cause for the nondisclosure of [the declarant's] identity and
there is sufficient corroboration by other means."' 04
While a few courts have discussed the right of confrontation some-
what explicitly,105 most courts of appeals typically analyze Fortier-
type situations on due process grounds, as was done in Williams.'
06
A prototypical case is the Tenth Circuit's decision in United States v.
Beaulieu.I07 The Beaulieu court relied in part on Williams in refining
the "differences between the guilt phase and the sentencing phase of
a criminal proceeding."1 08 Thus, the court stated, an offender does
not have an absolute right of confrontation at sentencing.109 "We
believe the better rule, therefore, is that reliable hearsay ... may be
used at sentencing to determine the appropriate punishment.",' 1o
101. 519 F. Supp. 751 (E.D. Wis. 1981), aff'd, 719 F.2d 887 (7th Cir. 1982). Mar-
shall was cited with approval by the Sentencing Commission's policy manual as the
ideal method of dealing with hearsay at sentencing. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES,
supra note 98, § 6A1.I comment.
102. 519 F. Supp. at 754.
103. 579 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1978).
104. Id. at 713.
105. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 897 F.2d 1324, 1328 (5th Cir. 1990)
(Confrontation rights of an offender are severely restricted at sentencing hearing.);
United States v. Luna, 734 F. Supp. 552, 554 (D. Me. 1990) (Confrontation right is
insufficient to preclude use of reliable hearsay at noncapital sentencing
proceedings.).
106. Appellant was found guilty after a fairly conducted trial. His sentence
followed a hearing conducted by the judge. Upon the judge's inquiry as to
why [the death] sentence should not be imposed, the defendant made state-
ments. His counsel made extended arguments. The case went to the high-
est court in the state, and that court had power to reverse for abuse of
discretion or legal error in the imposition of the sentence. That court af-
firmed. We hold that appellant was not denied due process of law.
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 252 (1949). See infra note 110.
107. 893 F.2d 1177 (10th Cir. 1990).
108. Id. at 1180.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1181. The Tenth Circuit applied the same reasoning again in United
States v. Reid, 911 F.2d 1456, 1464 (10th Cir. 1990) (reliable hearsay may be used at
sentencing). Most other circuits have applied a similar test. See United States v.
Sciarrino, 884 F.2d 95, 97 (3d Cir. 1989) ("[W]e reject [the] contention that the dis-
trict courts may never rely in a sentencing hearing on hearsay evidence for the truth
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Beaulieu concluded that the offender was not denied due process."I'
The problem presented in Fortier was perhaps dealt with best in
United States v. Luna. 112 Luna relied on Williams and Beaulieu to decide
that the government's information may be relied upon to increase
the offender's sentence."l 3 The Luna court also rejected the ap-
proach taken in United States v. Castellanos,' "4 where that court did not
rely on any particular precedent at all.15
Prior to Fortier, United States v. York 116 was the most frequently
cited case in the Eighth Circuit. York held that uncorroborated hear-
say evidence contained in a presentence report may be considered by
the sentencing judge provided the persons sentenced are given an
opportunity to explain or rebut the evidence.'17
E. Summary of Background
Traditionally, courts have had wide latitude in determining what
information will be considered at sentencing. The sentencing re-
forms of Congress in 1984 sought to narrow the range of possible
sentences and to make them predetermined by the facts of the case.
This change in policy has had little, if any, impact on courts' analyses
of whether the right of confrontation may be invoked at a sentencing
hearing.
of the matter asserted."); United States v. Agyemang, 876 F.2d 1264, 1271 (7th Cir.
1989) (Allowing hearsay provides the greatest amount of information possible at sen-
tencing and avoids turning the sentencing hearing into a never ending parade of
witnesses.); United States v. Carmona, 873 F.2d 569, 574 (2d Cir. 1989) ("It is not a
denial of due process.., to rely on evidence given by witnesses whom the defendant
could neither confront nor cross-examine."). But see United States v. Castellanos,
882 F.2d 474, 476-77 (11 th Cir. 1989) (Court may not consider findings from an-
other trial because offender could not cross-examine declarant.); Arnett v. Ricketts,
665 F. Supp. 1437, 1444 (D. Ariz. 1987) (Violation of confrontation clause found
where offender had no opportunity to cross-examine preparers of presentence
report.).
111. Beaulieu, 893 F.2d at 1181.
112. 734 F. Supp. 552 (D. Me. 1990).
113. Id. at 554-55.
114. 882 F.2d 474 (1 lth Cir. 1989).
115. "No specific rationale for this conclusion [in Castallanos] and no basis for that
conclusion, other than that set forth above, is stated in the opinion." Luna, 734 F.
Supp. at 554.
116. 830 F.2d 885 (8th Cir. 1987) (per curiam).
117. Id. at 893. See also United States v. Evans, 891 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1989) (Trial
court could consider estimate of state chemist regarding defendant's drug manufac-
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II. CASE DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS
A. The Decision in United States v. Fortier
1. Facts
Michael Fortier was arrested on December 3, 1987, in Grand
Forks, North Dakota, for possession of cocaine. Law enforcement
officers found 139 grams of cocaine in Fortier's clothing after stop-
ping and searching his vehicle. No charges were filed at that time." 18
On April 5, 1988, an informant told law enforcement officers he
had seen Fortier give approximately one pound of cocaine to an-
other person. The informant also surrendered approximately 249
grams of cocaine that allegedly belonged to Fortier. Several under-
cover attempts to purchase cocaine from Fortier were
unsuccessful. 119
On October 26, 1988, federal officers indicted Fortier, relying
chiefly on evidence from his first arrest. Count I charged Fortier
with possession of the 139 grams of cocaine found in his clothing in
December 1987. Count II charged him with possession of the 249
grams of cocaine obtained from the confidential informant. Count
III charged him with conspiracy to distribute one pound of cocaine,
based on the informant's statement of Fortier's interaction with the
other person.' 20
When Fortier pled guilty to Count I, Counts II and III were dis-
missed. The Government recommended a sentence of twenty-seven
months, as had been agreed to during the plea negotiations. At the
sentencing hearing, counsel for Fortier argued that there was insuffi-
cient proof that Fortier actually possessed the cocaine identified in
Count II to include that information in the sentencing determina-
tion. Nonetheless, the trial court found, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that Fortier had possessed the cocaine identified in Count
11.121 The court therefore considered this amount in calculating a
sentence of twenty-seven months and a $3,050 fine. 122
2. Discussion
The Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court's decision with re-
spect to one issue only: the confrontation clause.' 23 The court of
appeals stated that the evidence considered at the sentencing hear-
118. United States v. Fortier, 911 F.2d 100, 101 (8th Cir. 1990).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 101-02.
121. Id. at 102. The court found this by using the presentence report, prepared
by an employee of the United States Probation Office. Id.
122. Id. at 103.
123. Id. Part II of the Eighth Circuit's opinion begins: "Fortier's most compelling
argument on appeal, and the ground on which we reverse his sentence, is that the
[Vol. 17
20
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 6
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol17/iss3/6
CONFRONTATION AT SENTENCING
ing was hearsay of a type not admissible under either procedural
rules124 or the sentencing guidelines.125
In its brief discussion of the confrontation clause, the court stated
plainly that "the Confrontation Clause ... does apply" at a sentenc-
ing hearing.126 After establishing this, the court dismissed the co-
conspirator exception as inapplicable.127 The court found that the
fact-finding contained in the presentence report, which was relied
upon by the district court, was not subject to cross-examination and
thus was a violation of the confrontation clause.128
B. Analysis
The opinion in Fortier is faulty for two reasons. First, the court's
analysis is abrupt and incomplete. Second, after incorrectly stating
the law regarding the application of the confrontation clause to the
sentencing phase, the court applied the confrontation clause directly,
rather than applying the fourteenth amendment's due process
protections. 129
The Eighth Circuit reached its decision without discussing several
relevant cases, including Williams v. New York.13o The lack of com-
pleteness in the analysis is likely the reason for the erroneous state-
evidence relied upon by the District Court to include the 249 grams of cocaine in
calculating his sentence violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause." Id.
124. A court is required, if facts in a presentence report are disputed, either to
resolve the dispute or to state that the court is not considering disputed facts when
issuing a sentence. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(3)(D).
125. If the parties dispute facts included in the presentence report, a court may
resolve the dispute only with information which has "sufficient indicia of reliability to
support its probable accuracy." SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 98, § 6AI.3(a).
126. Fortier, 911 F.2d at 103. Fortier cites, as authority for this proposition, United
States v. Streeter, 907 F.2d 781, 791-92 (8th Cir. 1990). This assertion in Streeter is,
however, completely unsupported by any authority from either the Eighth Circuit or
the Supreme Court.
127. Fortier, 911 F.2d at 104.
128. Id. at 102, 104.
129. Id. at 103.
130. 337 U.S. 241 (1949) (Due process clause does not require that a person con-
victed after a fair trial be confronted with and permitted to cross-examine witnesses.).
The Fortier court received little assistance from defense counsel, whose brief was
abrupt and devoid of judicial authority. The defendant's argument for a reversal
based on the confrontation clause read, in its entirety, as follows:
Article 6 provides in part;
"(T)he accused shall enjoy the right.., to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him..."
The unreliable informant wasn't there. The SA of unknown reliabaility
[sic] wasn't there. The only witness against Fortier as to the conduct in
Count 2 was the P.S.I.
It is difficult to confront and cross-examine a conclusory document pre-
pared by an obviously prosecutional probation officer from unknown
sources alluding to unreliable information.
Fortier was denied his right to confront witnesses against him.
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ment that the confrontation clause applies directly to a sentencing
hearing.13' The court cited its recent decision in United States v.
Streeter 132 as authority for this proposition; however, Streeter itself is
flawed because its statement of this rule cites no support.' 3 3 Mean-
while, the decision ignored many cases from the Eighth Circuit and
other circuit courts which have interpreted the few applicable
Supreme Court cases.' 34
Fortier stands alone in that it analyzes the issue in terms of the con-
frontation clause only.135 Nearly all precedent-from Williams to
present-day drug sentencing cases-indicates that the proper ques-
tion is whether the defendant received due process.' 3 6 Though the
confrontation clause is perhaps more workable because it is a bright
line that has been clearly marked by decades of decisions, Williams
held that it simply does not apply at sentencing.t37
Brief for Appellant at 5, United States v. Fortier, 911 F.2d 100 (8th Cir. 1990) (89-
5179-ND).
The government apparently did not find the appellant's argument persuasive
because it devoted only a small part of its brief to that issue: "Regarding [Fortier's]
confrontation of witnesses claim, there is no requirement that witnesses testify in
person at sentencing hearings, and hearsay is acceptable as long as he had an oppor-
tunity to explain or rebut the proffered information." Brief for Appellee at 12,
United States v. Fortier, 911 F.2d 100 (8th Cir. 1990) (89-5179-ND) (citing United
States v. York, 830 F.2d 885, 893 (8th Cir. 1987).
131. The confrontation clause has an indirect application at sentencing, which is
recognized by applying a due process test. See supra text accompanying notes 105-11.
132. 907 F.2d 781 (8th Cir. 1990).
133. See supra note 127.
134. See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text. Recently, the Third Circuit
indirectly criticized Fortier, saying that, while it sympathizes with Fortier's goal, its own
approach avoids "the doctrinal pitfalls that would accompany adoption of the Fortier
rationale." United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1103 n.19 (3d Cir. 1990).
135. The Fortier approach has been reaffirmed in several cases since it was an-
nounced. See United States v. Lowrimore, 923 F.2d 590 (8th Cir. 1991) (Admission
of hearsay statements violated confrontation clause.); United States v. Cammisano,
917 F.2d 1057 (8th Cir. 1990) (Confrontation clause applied at sentencing). But see
United States v. Rivers, 917 F.2d 369 (8th Cir. 1990) (applying due process analysis).
Fortier was applied with considerable disagreement, however, in United States v.
Wise, 923 F.2d 86 (8th Cir. 1991) (per curiam), vacated and reh'g granted (March 15,
1991). The Wise court explicitly stated that the confrontation clause applied at sen-
tencing and enumerated the procedures the trial court should have taken. A dissent
argued that the "better view" was that expressed by Kikumura and Beaulieu, where the
confrontation clause was held not to apply and a due process clause analysis was
employed. Id. at 87-88 (Gibson, J., dissenting). A concurring opinion expressed
sympathy with the dissent but voted to reverse the conviction "only because . . .
Fortier compels such a holding." Id. at 87 (Wollman, J., concurring).
136. See, e.g., United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990); United
States v. Beaulieu, 893 F.2d 1177 (10th Cir. 1990). See also supra note 110.
137. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949).
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1. The Question Not Discussed by Fortier
Despite its faults, Fortier raises a provocative question: Considering
that the sentencing reforms have created nearly automatic conse-
quences for particular fact patterns, should the law respond by requir-
ing confrontation during the sentencing phase of a criminal
proceeding? The justifications for the current state of the law are
not unassailable. However, few judges or commentators have at-
tempted to argue for a change.138
A survey of the cases interpreting the confrontation clause reveals
that the fundamental purpose of the clause is to guarantee accuracy
by cross-examination so that no defendant is punished without first
being found guilty in a fair and accurate trial. This purpose should
be reexamined and the scope of the protection expanded to ensure
that the degree of punishment is fair. Such an expansion of the pur-
pose should not be undertaken lightly, especially considering that
the current state of the law already recognizes that confrontation
may be essential for due process.
a. The Distinction Between the Guilt Phase and the Penalty Phase
The rights conferred by the confrontation clause apply at all
"criminal prosecutions."139 This clause has been interpreted to re-
quire confrontation only at the guilt phase of a criminal proceeding.
The distinction between the guilt phase of a criminal proceeding, at
which guilt or innocence is determined, and the penalty phase, at
which convicted offenders are sentenced, was drawn clearly in Wil-
liams v. New York.140 Judges construe evidentiary rules strictly during
the guilt phase "to prevent tribunals . . . from being influenced to
convict for [an] offense by evidence that the defendant had habitually
138. One exception is Taparauskas, An Argument for Confrontation at Sentencing:
Bringing the Offender into the Sentencing Process, 8 CuMB. L. REV. 403 (1978). The article
argued that Williams is based on a view of sentencing that existed at the time of the
adoption of the Bill of Rights and should be updated. Id. at 438-39.
Ironically, this author argued that the preference for rehabilitation, prevalent at
the time the article was published, makes application of the confrontation clause at
sentencing more justifiable. The author argued that shaping a sentence around the
needs of the offender required more accurate information at sentencing. Id. at 439.
This case comment, on the other hand, is based on the premise that more accurate
fact-finding is preferred under the new system which eschews rehabilitation in favor
of uniform punishment. See also Note, How Unreliable Factfinding Can Undermine Sentenc-
ing Guidelines, 95 YALE LJ. 1258 (1986) (arguing that strict guidelines should not be
superimposed on a tradition of unreliable factfinding at sentencing); Schulhofer, Due
Process of Sentencing, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 733, 764 (1980) (predicting, though not pro-
posing, that the right to cross-examine witnesses at a sentencing hearing would be
"constitutionally mandated" if sentencing guidelines were adopted).
139. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
140. 337 U.S. 241, 246-48 (1949); see also supra text accompanying notes 59-61.
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engaged in other misconduct."141 But in sentencing, a judge is not
so confined because the "fullest information" is "[h]ighly relevant-
if not essential-to [the] selection of an appropriate sentence."1 42
These arguments followed naturally from the then "modern philoso-
phy of penology that the punishment should fit the offender and not
merely the crime."14s
The philosophy that undergirds Williams has been replaced by a
newer philosophy. The general sentencing policy now in place, ex-
plicitly stated by Congress in 1984, is that sentencing should be con-
sistent. While Congress allowed some degree of judicial discretion
to remain,'44 its overriding goal was to reduce the "unjustifiably
wide range of sentences" 145 by attaching uniform penalties to similar
crimes committed under similar circumstances. The result can be
virtually a formula which replaces discretionary sentencing with
mandatory sentences determined by underlying facts.146
Considering this change in policy, it is clear that the facts consid-
ered at sentencing have more importance than they did before 1984.
Instead of merely being relevant information whose impact on the
sentencing decision was unknowable, now each fact may have a di-
rect and certain consequence.'47 The importance of Williams, which
was premised upon a system which tailored a sentence to each of-
fender, is diminished. One commentator said, "As applied to a sen-
tencing reform system designed to limit the general range of
information considered relevant in sentencing, to narrow the judge's
discretion, and to exclude rehabilitative concerns in most instances,
Williams could be considered thoroughly anachronistic."148
141. Id. at 247.
142. Id.
143. Id. (citing People v. Johnson, 252 N.Y. 387, 392, 169 N.E. 619, 621 (1930)).
144. See supra text accompanying notes 97-98.
145. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 93, at 38, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 3221.
146. See United States v. Burch, 873 F.2d 765, 768 (5th Cir. 1989) ("In adopting
the [sentencing] guidelines, Congress abandoned the maxim that 'the punishment
should fit the offender and not merely the crime.'" (quoting Williams v. New York,
337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949))).
147. There is no better example than Fortier's own experience. Though he was
convicted of possessing 139 grams of cocaine, he was sentenced as if he were con-
victed of possessing 388 grams, based on information from an informant which was
not introduced as evidence at the guilt stage of the trial. United States v. Fortier, 911
F.2d 100, 102 (8th Cir. 1990).
148. Schulhofer, supra note 139, at 762. The author reasoned as follows:
[RIeliance on Williams would seem particularly difficult because the Court's
approval of flexible procedures in that case was quite explicitly grounded on
their importance for the effective operation of a regime of indeterminate
sentences, involving assessment of diverse facets of the offender's personal-
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Given the underlying effect of the sentencing guidelines on the
precedential value of Williams, the question arises as to whether a
new doctrine should be adopted. Some Supreme Court decisions
interpreting the confrontation clause suggest an argument that could
be used to extend the right of confrontation to sentencing. For ex-
ample, the Court, in Chambers v. Mississippi,t49 rejected a conclusory
label and held that a defendant's confrontation clause rights should
depend on the degree to which his or her interests are at risk. The
Court focused on the "function" of testimony, not its "form,"150 ar-
guably allowing cross-examination whenever such would benefit a
defendant. This rationale could also apply at sentencing, where a
defendant can benefit by cross-examination just as much as at trial,
despite the different purpose of the evidence presented at each
stage. Similarly, if the same approach were applied to facts similar to
those in Fortier, the Court might conclude that the potential harm to
a defendant's interests is more determinative of whether the right
exists than is the stage of the proceeding.
In addition, because substantial rights of an accused are affected,
the sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel'5t could be ex-
tended to confrontation at sentencing. In Mempa v. Rhay,152 the
Court held that the defendant had a right to counsel at sentencing
because sentencing is "a stage of a criminal proceeding where sub-
stantial rights of a criminal accused may be affected."t53 Similarly, a
defendant may need the right of confrontation at sentencing, since
he or she may have substantial rights which are put at risk at that
stage.
These arguments for applying the confrontation clause at sentenc-
ing were countered by the Court in Specht v. Patterson, 154 which found
a due process violation where a court did not permit confrontation at
sentencing and where the fact-finding process amounted to a new
Id. (citations omitted).
149. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
150. The Court specifically identified the function of cross-examination as ensur-
ing the "accuracy of the truth-determining process." Id. at 295. In Chambers, the
Court held that the accused has an absolute right to confront and cross-examine
damaging testimony. Id. at 297-98. Whether or not the accused put that witness on
the stand is immaterial in defending that right. Id.
151. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the fight... to have the
assistance of counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
152. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
153. In an attempt to revoke probation, the court allowed incriminating hearsay
testimony from the probation officer of the accused. Id. at 132. During this proceed-
ing the accused was not appointed counsel by the court. Id. at 131. In Mempa, the
accused was charged with another crime at sentencing, thus, "substantial rights"
were affected. Id. at 134.
154. 386 U.S. 605 (1967); see also supra text accompanying notes 68-74.
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charge against the offender. 155 The sentencing procedure in Specht
is analogous to that in Fortier, in that the trial court imposed a new
sentence because of facts presented at the sentencing hearing. Specht
resolves the problem within the due process framework, but does so
by elevating the rights of the offender to a degree that approximates
the rights under the confrontation clause.
The facts in Specht are similar to those in Fortier, where the sen-
tence was increased by a new finding of fact. Although a formal dis-
tinction between assessing a new sentence and increasing the
sentence of an existing conviction exists, the result is the same-ex-
tended incarceration. Specht and Fortier can be reconciled, however,
by viewing them as cases concerning situations where a trial court
gives identical treatment to either a finding of fact or a new charge in
increasing the defendant's sentence. In fact, Specht has been applied
to a sentence issued under the sentencing guidelines in United States
v. Blade, where the Eighth Circuit found that a "new charge"
existed. 156
Because Fortier received the same sentence as if he had been con-
victed of Count I and Count II,157 the discretionary consideration of
Fortier's second alleged possession of cocaine, supported at the sen-
tencing hearing by triple hearsay, is arguably identical to a new
charge. It is apparent that Specht could have been applied to the facts
in Fortier to reverse the conviction without overhauling established
law.
b. The Sufficiency and Practicality of a Due Process Analysis
Almost all jurisdictions facing this issue have applied a due process
test which recognizes only the general principle of confrontation.' 5 8
The due process test permits hearsay evidence if it has "sufficient
indicia of reliability."159 This test was applied in Williams v. New
York. 160
The due process test as explained in Williams can be more benefi-
cial, in the long run, for defendants. The Williams Court explained
that technical violations of the confrontation clause should be ex-
155. Specht, 386 U.S. at 608. The Court struck down the Colorado Sex Offenders
Act that automatically convicted sex offenders of a separate offense of posing a seri-
ous bodily harm to the public. Id. at 610-11. The right of confrontation thus extends
to the separate offense and an automatic conviction cannot be upheld. Id.
156. United States v. Blade, 811 F.2d 461, 468-69 (8th Cir. 1987).
157. See supra note 147.
158. See, e.g., United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990); United
States v. Beaulieu, 893 F.2d 1177 (10th Cir. 1990). See also supra note 110.
159. Beaulieu, 893 F.2d at 1181 (holding that reliable hearsay evidence that may be
barred from the guilt phase of the trial can be used during sentencing without violat-
ing due process).
160. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
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cused because the additional information may ease defendants'
sentences. '61 This is no longer true since additional factors can, and
usually do, cause an increase in an offender's sentence. A modern
Court might argue, however, that a due process analysis is preferable
because, with its inherent flexibility, it will bring about the result that
appears most fair in the present case. This fairness principle may
have been the real motivation for the rationale stated in Williams.
Regardless of the results of the due process test, it is clear that the
due process test has the disadvantage of vagueness. The confronta-
tion clause has been interpreted often and therefore has the advan-
tage of offering a "brighter line" by which to make decisions. Under
a confrontation clause analysis, inadmissible evidence is more easily
distinguishable from admissible evidence.
The due process analysis is perhaps more desirable for reasons of
practicality. Applying the confrontation clause could cause sentenc-
ing hearings to become longer and more complex. Some courts
have stated that applying the confrontation clause to sentencing
would be impractical.162 While this view shows a degree of honesty,
it may undermine a criminal justice system that strives to assure just
treatment and due process at every stage. An instance of unfairness,
or the mere perception of unfairness, in an otherwise fair system
could have damaging effects upon the public trust.163
Extending the confrontation clause to the sentencing phase is not,
however, necessary to solving the problem of unfairness to offend-
161. Id. at 248-50. The Court stated that the purpose for changes in sentencing
procedure was to reduce sentences and return rehabilitated offenders back to society
as useful citizens. Id.
162. See, e.g., United States v. Agyemang, 876 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1989). The
Court stated:
There is also a practical reason for allowing hearsay: given the breadth of
information properly allowable at a sentencing hearing, not allowing the
court to consider hearsay could turn the sentencing hearing "into an end-
less parade of witnesses .... To require the government to present live
witnesses or other admissible evidence to support every assertion in a pre-
trial report, just as it must support every element of a crime at trial, would
turn the sentencing hearing into a trial, something a sentencing hearing was
not meant to be.
Id. at 1271 (citations omitted).
163. The recent securities fraud prosecution of Michael Milken, former invest-
ment banker at Drexel Burnham Lambert, provides a good example of how impracti-
cal a sentencing hearing can be if, because fairness is thought to be especially
important, an offender is afforded all procedural rights: "A federal judge delayed the
sentencing of Michael Milken .. .and ordered an unusual hearing to consider addi-
tional crimes the government has alleged Mr. Milken committed, but to which he
hasn't pleaded guilty." Hearing Will Delay Milken Sentencing, Wall St.J., Sept. 28, 1990,
at B6, col. 1. The government's efforts to raise Milken's sentence due to additional
factors raised protests among some writers not usually associated with the rights of
the criminally accused: "Prosecutors who originally sought a sentence of 520 years
have decided the only "trial" they will risk is a sentencing hearing without niceties
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ers. The existing due process framework will give offenders the right
to cross-examine witnesses when fairness so dictates. The decision
in Specht implies that, when faced with a situation like Fortier, the
Court may create a solution without drastically altering the applica-
tion of the confrontation clause. Even without a new statement of
the law by the United States Supreme Court, the principle of con-
frontation can be honored via the due process analysis if Specht is
given its proper interpretation.
2. Fortier and Stare Decisis
Regardless of what the law should be, the right of confrontation
does not currently exist at sentencing. However, following the time-
honored principle of stare decisis,t 64 the Eighth Circuit should not im-
plement such a right until the Supreme Court does so. Arguments
favoring application of the confrontation clause at sentencing should
not be implemented by a lower court. But, the arguments should be




Traditional notions of due process at sentencing hearings have
merged with a new policy allowing only minimal discretion in sen-
tencing. As a result, the sentencing decision has become more fact-
dependent. The presentence report, prepared by a nameless proba-
such as a jury or presumption of innocence." Crovitz, Punish Milkenfor What He Did,
Not What Prosecutors Say He Did, Wall St. J., Sept. 26, 1990, at At5, col. 3.
It is interesting to note that the prolonged sentencing hearing actually benefitted
the offender. At the sentencing hearing, which lasted approximately two weeks, one
witness changed his earlier testimony, which was inculpatory of Milken, after he re-
ceived immunity from prosecution. Crovitz, Who Gets Presumption of Innocence? Milken,
Not Prosecutors, Wall St.J., Oct. 31, 1990, at A15, col. 6. Thus, there is evidence that
procedural rights may benefit defendants even where unexpected. See United States
v. Milken, No. SS 89 Cr. 41 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 1990) (allowing character evidence
that was otherwise inadmissible during the sentencing hearing).
164. "Stare decisis" is the "[p]olicy of courts to stand by precedent and not to
disturb settled point." It is the "[d]octrine that, when a court has once laid down a
principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle
and apply it to all future cases, where facts are substantially the same; regardless of
whether the parties and property are the same." The doctrine is "grounded on [the]
theory that security and certainty require that accepted and established legal princi-
ples, under which rights may accrue, be recognized and followed." BLACK'S LAw Dic-
TIONARY 1406 (6th ed. 1990).
165. See, e.g., United States v. Jefferson, 906 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1990). Jefferson
concerned a different legal issue but is an example of an intermediate appellate court
deferring to the Supreme Court as the sole authority to initiate developments in the
law: "The time has come, it seems to me, for a serious reexamination of the exclu-
sionary rule .... This Court, however, is not the forum in which such a reexamina-
tion can take place." Id. at 352 (Bowman, J., concurring).
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tion officer determines the fate of a criminal offender. But the pro-
bation officer, and the sources that officer uses, are not subject to
cross-examination.
The facts contained in a presentence report are especially impor-
tant in convictions involving illegal drugs, where the sentence is de-
termined in part by the quantity of drugs. The quantity upon which
a sentence is based can be, according to the sentencing guidelines,
more than the quantity for which the offender was convicted. Be-
cause forty-four percent of federal criminal cases involve drug pos-
session,166 this issue is one which frequently confronts our federal
courts.
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue presented by
Fortier. Supreme Court review of the application of the confrontation
clause and due process guarantees to the sentencing phase of a crim-
inal action would clarify this area. This issue "is vital to the adminis-
tration of sentencing proceedings under the Sentencing Reform
Act."167
It is likely that the Court will not apply the confrontation clause
directly to the sentencing phase. Instead, the Court should expand
the principle of Specht v. Patterson 168 to allow cross-examination when
particular facts are the equivalent of a new prosecution. Appellate
courts should take this approach to maintain consistency with
Supreme Court precedent. By doing so, appellate courts could con-
sider a broad range of information and still protect the criminal of-
fender from the risk of being sentenced for crimes that have been
alleged but not proven.
Matthew E. Johnson
166. FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., NEWS RELEASE 2 (Apr. 2, 1990).
167. United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1103 n.19 (3d Cir. 1990) (apply-
ing higher standards of proof and higher standards of reliability for hearsay evidence
at a sentencing hearing; declined to adopt the Fortier approach but attempted to sat-
isfy its concerns).
168. 386 U.S. 605, 608 (1967) (allowing confrontation if offender is charged with
a separate offense at sentencing).
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